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WAR-TIME DEPRECIATION IN OPEN HEARTH STEEL
PLANTS AND ROLLING MILLS

It may seem strange to be writing now about conditions affect
ing depreciation in 1917 and 1918, but when it is considered that
there are many corporations whose liability for income and excess
profits taxes for those years have not yet been audited by the
Treasury Department, it will be conceded that such a discussion is
timely. It may be safely asserted that there are many accountants
of large steel companies who are still engaged with problems affect
ing the 1917 and 1918 income tax returns of their companies, and
depreciation is by no means the least important of these problems.
The subject, therefore, may prove of interest to them as well as to
accountants in other industries which operated under similarly
trying conditions during the War Period.
The term “War Period” as used herein includes the years
.1917, 1918, 1919 and 1920. Although the War ended in the latter
part of 1918, the years 1919 and 1920 were anything but normal.
In fact, of these four years, 1920 may be said to have been the
worst, culminating in the peak of the period of inflation. The
last two years were “blessed” with all the evils that usually accom
pany such a period.
In many steel plants, 1920 witnessed the production of higher
tonnages of steel products of all kinds than had any previous year.
The question of abnormal depreciation during the War Period
has been considered at various times, and engineering and account
ing authorities have thoroughly demonstrated the necessity for
making provision therefor. The engineers of the Ordnance De
partment, for example, made allowance for extraordinary deprecia
tion in valuing machinery. In the charts made by them for ap
praisal purposes, they have provided for substantial increases in
the normal rate of depreciation in all cases where overtime work
was a factor during War production. In their book entitled “Cost
Accounting,” Major J. Lee Nicholson and John F. D. Rohrbach
have placed themselves on record as accepting the theory of ex
traordinary depreciation where conditions are abnormal. The
strongest authority, in the eyes of the taxpayer, however, is the
official attitude of the Income Tax Unit. This is reflected in the
following excerpt from Bulletin E, one of its publications: “It is
recognized also that property, for example, manufacturing ma
chinery, may be subject to extraordinary depreciation due to being
operated overtime, at an overload, or being used for some purpose
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for which it is not adapted. Under such conditions a taxpayer may
deduct, in addition to the amount measuring the depreciation under
normal conditions, a further sum to provide for the extraordinary
depreciation.”
The burden of proof, however, will be upon the taxpayer to
convince the Government as to the extent of abnormal depreciation
which was suffered, and in passing upon this question weight will
be given by the Unit to such factors as high production, overtime
work, inefficiency of labor, inability to make repairs properly, and
any other peculiar conditions which may have interfered with the
smooth operation of machinery and equipment. These will be dis
cussed in more detail below.
In this article, normal and ordinary causes of depreciation as
mere efflux of time, exposure to the elements, excessive heat gen
erated by furnaces, soaking pits, etc., corroding action of chemical
vapors, etc., will not be considered. The unusual wear and tear
sustained during the War Period was brought about principally by
the various abnormal causes mentioned above and these will fur
nish the basis for this discussion.

Effect of High Production on Equipment and Depreciation
Production is one of the most important causes of depreciation.
Machinery is purchased for the specific purpose of turning out pro
duction or aiding indirectly in doing so. In a great many cases
engineers can roughly estimate the approximate number of units
of production which a machine will manufacture before it is ready
for the scrap heap. It is logical to assume, therefore, that hasten
ing the processes of production will accelerate the rate of depre
ciation. One of the best illustrations of this principle is the case
of certain, powerful cannon with respect to which it is definitely
known in advance how many shots they can fire. While this is an
extreme case, the same principle underlies the operation of ordinary
machinery except that it does not work out as easily as in the
example given.
Normally, as far as production is concerned, depreciation is
caused by actual contact of the product with the machinery, and,
with respect to auxiliary equipment, by the number of motions or
movements necessary to keep in operation the equipment engaged
directly in production. In cases of high production we have more
production units coming in contact with what we might call
Primary Equipment and a noticeable increase in the number of
movements of auxiliary equipment to keep pace with increased
production. It is true, therefore, that the demands of high pro
duction will affect not only the equipment with which the steel in
the various manufacturing processes comes in direct contact, but
also auxiliary departments or equipment such as steam or electric
generating departments, gas producers, coal pulverizing equipment,
etc. This is patent. If high tonnage of steel is handled in the
furnaces, there will be extraordinary usage of cranes, charging
4

cars, gas producers, steam generating equipment, etc., to keep pace
with the increased demands of the production department.
An excellent illustration of direct depreciation is found in the
blooming mill where every ton of steel made in the open hearth
furnaces in the form of ingots is reduced, by a rolling process, to
“blooms.” Glancing into a blooming mill one is struck by the maze
of machinery. Every ton of steel that passes through the rolls jars
the entire rolling mechanism, and contributes its quota of vibration
which in time undermines even the foundations. It logically fol
lows that an increase in the tonnage of steel passing through the
blooming mill, will correspondingly increase the rate of deprecia
tion in this department.
A simple illustration of the same principle is contained in the
experience of a steel company which built a plant in 1907. During
the first three years of operation, production was considered of
primary importance in order that previous production records in
other plants of the same company might be broken. Furnaces were
forced to produce more than rated capacity and in the process,
important operating details were neglected to an extent which did
not augur well for the condition of equipment. In consequence,
after only three years of operation, it was apparent that the plant
was in worse physical condition than another plant owned by the
same company which had been operated under normal conditions
for nine years. All other factors having been the same, it may be
safely assumed that the hastening of depreciation was caused by
abnormal production.
With regard to many steel companies the average production
of steel in the War Period was over 100% greater than the average
of pre-war years. It is granted that in part, this may have been
due to the installation of additional open hearth furnaces or, in
other words, to an increase in the capacity of the plant. A large
part, however, was the result of “driving the furnaces,” squeezing
the last ounce of possible production out of them. From a study
made in one plant it was found that in 1918 production had been
increased 70 per cent over 1914. 50 per cent of this increase was
accounted for by a similar increase in rated capacity. 20 per cent
of the increase was a result of “driving” for high production.
The discussion of the effects of such practice on equipment
may be more readily understood if considered in connection with
the following description of an open hearth furnace. Each furnace,
although a complete unit in itself, is usually one of a series of from
six to eight or more, built in a row. On the outside of the steel
building in which they are located can be seen many towering
stacks, corresponding in number to the number of furnaces in the
plant. The furnaces are rectangular in form, being about 25 to
30 feet long, 20 to 25 feet wide, and from 10 to 15 feet high.
There are two checker chambers at either side to permit the
introduction of gas and air into the furnaces, in the proper state.
The checker system extends below the floor-level and consists of a
•network of brick so arranged as to allow a draft of air to pass
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up, around, and into the furnace. The walls and arched roof are
made of brick which are bound up and kept together by a heavy
steel framework, consisting of buckstays, beams, etc. There are
heavy iron doors on the front side of the furnace through which
the “charge” of raw material is introduced into the hearth. These
doors are manipulated by electric or hydraulic power.
At the floor level there is a steel pan, consisting of heavy
plates of steel, riveted together, upon which is spread a thick layer
of magnesite and dolomite or some other refractory material. The
inside of the furnace above this pan is usually referred to as the
hearth. There is a tap hole at the back of the furnace through
which the molten steel is made to flow into the large ladle at the
signal of the melter, as soon as his practiced eye, with the aid of
chemical analysis, shows that it is time to do so. Another item of
equipment is the heavy steel butterfly valve which is about seven
or eight feet high. This is part of the checker system and is the
point at which the air enters and leaves the furnaces.
The construction of each furnace may be divided into two sec
tions or parts, viz., a temporary section, consisting of the brick
work and other minor items used in connection therewith; and a
permanent one, which is made up of foundation, steel pan, checker
chambers proper, steel framework, valve, stack, etc. This distinc
tion is made because the brickwork is torn down every four to six
months for purposes of reconstruction; while the basic structure
of the furnace, referred to as permanent construction, should under
normal conditions of operation, last about 20 years. In consider
ing the question of depreciation, it is important that we bear in
mind this distinction.
One of the methods used to secure greater production during
the War Period was to increase the temperature in the hearth.
This tended to “sweat” out the bottom silica brick lining, thus dam
aging the steel pan. It also burned and bent the buckstays and
framework, getting them considerably out of line, and affecting the
entire basic structure of the furnaces.
Under ordinary conditions it is necessary to renew the brick
lining about every five or six months. Under such conditions, when
production is normal and well regulated, the condition of the brick
can be carefully observed so that the furnace may be shut down for
repairs in time. In the War Period we find things entirely changed.
The management was pushing for production and in many cases
took a long chance in running a furnace several additional heats,
when the condition of the brick clearly indicated that a shut down
was in order. The result was in many cases the flame burned clear
through the brick and caused severe damage to the iron work,
buckling and bending it out of shape. This rarely if ever occurs in
normal times.
Depreciation was caused in another manner by the desire to
meet the unparalleled demand for steel. In 1918, in order to secure
greater production in the blooming mill, the management of a cer
tain company attempted to use a larger sized ingot than the rolls
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and other equipment in that mill were designed to handle. This
particular mill had been constructed to take care of ingots of a
maximum weight of 6,600 pounds, but, in order to increase produc
tion, ingots weighing 10,000 pounds were forced through it. The
table rollers were not strong enough to stand the strain, and several
serious breakdowns occurred. Experimentation went on for more
than a year in an effort to strengthen the equipment, but all efforts
failed and the attempt was finally abandoned. When it is consid
ered that every pound of steel produced in the open hearths must
have been rolled in that blooming mill, it stands to reason that the
life of equipment in that department was shortened considerably.
Power companies broke down repeatedly during the War on
account of the tremendous increase in the demand for electric cur
rent brought about by high production in practically all industries.
In one case there were three breakdowns during a single year
which proved to be very disastrous to a certain steel company. In
the case cited, forty minutes after power was cut off, the water
storage supply in the stand pipes became exhausted on account of
the pumps being down. At a result, the water cooling equipment
around the open hearth furnaces burned up and the doors burned
out of the furnaces. Power was cut off with a ladle full of molten
steel suspended in mid-air. The steel froze, seriously damaging
the ladle. Charging machine equipment was damaged by power
being cut off with charging box inside the furnace. Numerous
other instances can be mentioned. The power company in this case
furnished low voltage during practically all of 1917 and 1918,
which damaged the electrical equipment all over the plant and
seriously interfered with operations. This is a notable example
of the confusion and chaos which prevailed during the war.
It is interesting to note that in many cases the War Industries
Board allocated orders to companies which the latter were not
equipped to handle, but which they nevertheless accepted out of
a spirit of patriotism and a desire to do their share in winning the
war. One company was practically forced to take orders for
French shell steel, the large sized bloom on which work damaged
the shears.
Production Method for Recording Depreciation
While on the subject of production and its effect on the ques
tion of depreciation, it may not be out of place to say a few words
on the “Production Method” of determining and charging off de
preciation. Under this method a pre-determined amount is charged
to operations for each ton of ingots and sheet steel produced. In
other words, actual production figures are used as a basis for com
puting depreciation. This is not an accurate method, and few steel
companies use this basis for arriving at a depreciation charge-off,
as there are other factors which must be considered besides pro
duction. For example, it is obvious that depreciation is going on
where a plant is idle. In fact, it is generally known that in some
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cases greater depreciation is sustained where a machine is idle
than when it is operated under normal conditions, so that while
there is a close relationship between production and depreciation,
an increase in the former does not necessarily produce a propor
tionate increase in the latter. In the opinion of the writer, the
“Production Method” should rarely be used to measure actual,
physical depreciation. This method, however, might serve effec
tively in connection with industries depending for their existence
on a supply of wasting assets, such as timber, for example. An
ideal illustration is that of a sawmill located near its source of
supply, away from an industrial center. Inasmuch as it will have
to discontinue operations as soon as its supply of timber is ex
hausted, and in that event the plant will be worth salvage value,
it would be good accounting practice to set up a reserve based on
the unit of production so that the entire cost of the mill may be
amortized by the time the last tree is leveled.

Straight Line Method
The straight-line method appears to be the most popular, one
and is generally used by steel company accountants. In ascertain
ing the periodic charge for depreciation under this method, a great
many accountants use a single, composite rate which is applied to
certain classes of equipment such as buildings, machinery, furni
ture and fixtures, etc. The writer has seen one instance where
plant account was sub-divided into more than fifty classifications
and depreciation was computed on the amount of each classification
by applying percentages which had been worked out to four deci
mal places. An extensive discussion of all of these methods does
not come within the scope of this paper. However, irrespective of
the method employed, an additional provision for depreciation
should have been made for the years 1917, 1918, 1919 and 1920.
What that additional amount or rate should have been must be
decided on the facts in each case and on the extent of ill treatment
to which equipment may have been subjected.
Effect of Overtime Work on Depreciation
Another cause of high depreciation is overtime work. This
was recognized by the Bureau of Aircraft Production which advo
cated an increase of 50 per cent over the normal depreciation rate
of factory equipment where, during the war, a plant was operated
three shifts a day instead of one.
During a large part of the War Period many steel plants were
operated at full blast seven days a week. Large premiums were
being paid for deliveries of steel and this served as an incentive to
work a plant to its utmost. In normal times, because of the nature
of the processes necessary to convert iron into steel, a plant is
usually operated 24 hours a day. But ordinarily the plant is closed
down on Sundays. During the War Period many plants ran 24
hours a day and 7 days a week for long stretches of time. Fur
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thermore, it should not be overlooked that in ordinary times there
are periodic shut-downs caused by lack of orders. There are
“slack times” when men will get off two and three days every
week. Such shut-downs and the regular day of rest furnish suffi
cient time in which to thoroughly inspect all items of equipment,
make repairs and keep things generally in shipshape condition.
It has been scientifically proved that metal is subject to fatigue.
It follows, therefore, that a period of rest at regular intervals will
lengthen the life of equipment. The constant vibration of ma
chinery must have a detrimental effect upon the buildings in which
it is located, and such rest periods will unquestionably prolong the
life of such structures.

Ineffiency of Labor
A discussion of this subject would be incomplete without some
reference to labor conditions during the War Period. During that
time labor on the average was very unsatisfactory. It is the con
sensus of opinion of mill superintendents and foremen that this
was one of the most serious and perplexing problems that it was
necessary to contend with during the war. Owing to the extraor
dinary demand for men, the employee unquestionably had the upper
hand. The situation was further aggravated by an unprecedented
rise in wages which contributed towards a spirit of independence.
There was a noticeable lack of cooperation and team-work.
It is significant to note that the above-described conditions
were found to exist even in the smaller steel towns where men had
worked in the same mills for years, some of them all their lives.
These unfortunate conditions may be attributed to the influx of
an undesirable type of foreign and other unskilled labor to take the
places of the men who had enlisted or were drafted. This dilution
of skilled forces with unskilled men must have had an important
bearing on the state of equipment. When these two factors are
considered: the first, that every machine, every unit of equipment,
had to be operated or manned by men; and the second, that un
skilled and inefficient labor had to be used, the question may very
well be asked whether machinery was given the attention and care
it required or whether it was manhandled.
The president of a steel company some years ago in an article
prepared for a business course said: “Of the three factors in
carrying on a business, neither machinery nor materials can com
pare in importance with the human element, the workmen who
operate the machines and handle the materials. The machines and
materials are at the mercy of a poor workman. If he is inefficient
or careless and indifferent, or disloyal and resentful, he can easily
reduce them to the junk pile and the scrap heap.” This statement
was intended to be applied under normal operating conditions. Its
importance may therefore be appreciated when it is interpreted in
the light of the unfavorable conditions which existed during the
War Period.
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The human element is more important in the steel industry
today than when the industry was in its infancy about 25 years
ago. In those days machinery played a much smaller part than
it does today. The greater part of the work was done by hand,
common labor being employed for the most part. For example,
charging of iron into the furnace was done by hand. This was
true also of stripping moulds and crushing scrap. Today these
operations are performed respectively by charging machines, me
chanical strippers, and skull crackers. Great strides have been
made in the construction and operation of cranes and there has
been a remarkable improvement in machinery in general all
over the plant which has created a demand for a more intelligent
class of labor. It must be admitted, considering the general in
efficiency of labor during the war and the difficulty of securing ex
perienced men to take the place of those that went to fight, that
machinery depreciated at a greater rate than normal.
To cite one example: The craneman should be expert in
manipulating his machine and the load which it may be carrying.
This requires great skill. Inefficient, careless, or green cranemen
have been known to swing loads against expensive machinery and to
damage the buckstays of furnaces. An efficient craneman can easily
put his machine out of commission. The life of a crane will be
shortened by running the trolley to the end of the tracks without
putting the brakes on or by continuing to wind up the hook after
it has reached the top, thus bending the shaft. During the War
many cranes were practically racked to pieces by their misuse.
Steel men are in agreement on the fact that the efficiency of
labor during the period under discussion was only 60 to 70 per cent
of what may be considered normal. The situation became very
acute in the latter part of 1919 when the big steel strike occurred,
which lasted from September to November. Inexperienced men
of the most undesirable type were brought in as strike breakers,
because it was necessary to keep the plants running at any cost
on account of the unheard-of demand for steel products. It will
be generally admitted that machinery and equipment suffered by
reason of this costly experience.
Some companies suffered more than others as far as labor
troubles were concerned. This was especially true with regard to
plants located away from the large labor centers. There is one
company in particular which experienced great difficulty in secur
ing the necessary skilled operatives. Its plant is located in Ken
tucky and skilled men were not to be obtained at all in that section.
Agents visited all the large industrial cities in an attempt to round
up an experienced working force, but what few men were obtained
in this manner were entirely unsatisfactory, being of the lowest
type of labor on the market. The company was confronted with
the task of breaking in the natives of that section of Kentucky.
This was a difficult task as these men had had no previous in
dustrial experience, most of them having been engaged in farming.
In the process of being broken in, these green country boys
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caused heavy depreciation on equipment. For example, charging
machine operators would let the charging box get stuck in the
furnace. Sometimes a leaky stopper would develop underneath a
ladle with 50 tons of molten steel suspended in mid-air. The ladle
crane operator, seeing red-hot metal flowing out accompanied by a
shower of sparks, would become panic-stricken and run out of the
plant, allowing the metal to damage cars, moulds and other equip
ment. Cranemen, charging machine operators, and others who
operated complex machinery in this plant, were instrumental in
causing heavy depreciation without doing so intentionally.
Considering all of these facts, there can be no question that
the low efficiency of labor during the War was responsible for a
large part of the abnormal depreciation which was sustained during
that period.
Inability to Make Repairs Properly
The most effective way to counteract depreciation is to make
repairs promptly and efficiently. Some accountants consider this
matter of paramount importance and where large amounts have
been spent in making repairs they have correspondingly reduced the
depreciation rates. This would seem to be a sound method where
the increased expenditures for repairs have been carefully analyzed
and it is found that they have succeeded in actually arresting
depreciation.
If the above is true, the reverse is equally so; that is, if there
was skimping in the making of repairs there must have been a
corresponding increase in the depreciation sustained. This is
exactly what occurred in most steel plants during the War. Pro
duction was a sort of “Golden Calf” which was worshipped to the
neglect of other essentials. Everything else was subordinated to
it and every ounce of energy that it was possible to commandeer
was diverted to increase production. There is no doubt that even
so important an item as repairs was sadly neglected.
A case in point is the matter of painting the steel buildings.
The open hearth building, which is constructed of steel sheeting,
is between one and two city blocks in length depending on the
number of furnaces it covers. Here is a mass of steel surface
which, if not painted on an average of once each year to maintain
it in a proper state of preservation, will rust away very quickly.
While some companies let this job by contract to outside painters,
a great many employ men who do nothing but paint. During the
War these men were to a great extent diverted to the stenciling
of boxes containing steel for shipment, and painting was neglected.
The same was true of steel stacks and in one plant, as a result of
such neglect, several stacks rusted away and fell over.
The soaking pits are an important example of the same thing.
In the process of steel-making, the molten steel is first poured from
the furnace into moulds. After the steel has solidified, but while
it is yet red-hot, the ingot is stripped from the mould and deposited
in a soaking pit where the heat in the ingot is distributed evenly.
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It is then ready for the blooming mill. In order to push produc
tion, soaking pits were repeatedly continued in operation where
they should have been shut down for repairs and relining. It is
possible to operate soaking pits in an inefficient sort of way where
repairs are overdue, but the pit is greatly damaged in doing so as
slag runs down into the checkers and clogs them. When the pit is
finally rebuilt it entails three times as much expense. Many soak
ing pits were practically destroyed by the end of 1920 and had to
be entirely rebuilt.
An unusually interesting example of the neglect of repairs in
the case of a battery of two blast furnaces, recently came to the
attention of the writer. Blast furnaces produce the principal raw
material of the open hearths, which is pig iron. In the course of
operations they should be shut down periodically for repairs and
relining, and in this respect they are somewhat similar to open
hearth furnaces. On account of the great demand for pig iron
during the War, to feed open hearth furnaces all over the country,
blast furnaces were operated straight through for inconceivably
long periods of time. In the case cited, repairs were neglected to
such a serious extent that when things quieted down the furnaces
were in a practically wrecked condition. They had to be dismantled
and completely rebuilt from the ground up.
Production seriously interfered with the condition of such
equipment as cranes and charging machines. A little attention
once a week will do wonders in keeping such machinery in good
condition. During the War they were neglected for six months at
a time. Normally, charging machine tracks, and all other tracks in
the plant and yards, are inspected regularly and maintained in good
condition. Here again, during the War, men who were engaged in
this work were to a great extent- if not entirely diverted to some
job in the production end of the business.
The spreading of tracks, allowed to go unnoticed, caused the
derailing of many a charging machine with damage all around.
Spread rails in the case of charging buggies, caused them to jump
the tracks and precipitate a load of pig iron against furnaces,
bending and damaging the buckstays. The spreading of crane
tracks had a tendency to derail one end of the crane and twist it
out of shape. In several cases cranes fell to the ground and became
candidates for the scrap heap. In the case of locomotive cranes,
poor condition of the brakes permitted the load to come down with
a bang, damaging whatever happened to be in the way. And so it
went all over the plant. A loose bolt here, a leaking tube there,
going unmended, might develop into serious functional trouble.
Not only were necessary repairs belated, but even when made
they were made under pressure. The management would have moved
heaven and earth, if that were possible to get things going as soon
as possible after a shut-down. As the time in which a repair is
made decreases, the cost increases and repairs made in this hurried
manner are in many cases not thorough. In the sheet mills there
is an iron bed-plate standing on a concrete foundation on which the
12

mill rests. Normally, to replace such a foundation requires from
eight to ten days’ time to permit the concrete to “set” properly.
During the war, the loss in production that would result from such
an enforced shut-down was so great, considering the high prices
that were being received for steel products, that foundations were
made with lead, which cost from five to ten times as much as
concrete but which did not last as long.
A situation which was of the utmost importance in connection
with the ability to make necessary repairs, was the condition of
the market for supplies. It was extremely difficult and at times
impossible to secure needed materials. Ties for railroad trackage
could not be obtained and fence posts had to be used instead. The
brick for the furnaces were of a very inferior quality, cracked and
crooked, although they cost over three times as much as the better
brick which was normally secured. On this account, in many in
stances the roof and walls of the furnaces caved in while a “heat”
was in progress. It was extremely difficult to procure dolomite and
magnesite as these products are imported from Austria. These
refractory materials are spread on the steel pan in the hearth, but,
on account of the shortage, were used very sparingly. The result
was that holes were burned in the steel pan which permitted the
red hot metal to flow over the open hearth floors, cars, rails, etc.
Upon cooling, gobs of steel were frozen to the equipment which it
was necessary to cut off by the use of a torch. This is another
sample of what it was necessary to contend with during the War.
For a certain time, before the situation had been properly
presented to them, some Government accountants contended that
extraordinary depreciation was counteracted by the large amounts
expended for repairs and replacements. The figures were very
misleading, the repair account in some cases showing an increase
over pre-war years of over 500 per cent. However, upon learning
the extent to which repairs were neglected, they agreed to a sub
stantial additional depreciation allowance.
A table showing merely the amount spent for repairs and
maintenance each year will be found to be practically worthless for
comparative purposes, as far as the question of depreciation is
concerned, for the reason that it deals with dollars rather than
with the actual amount of repairs made per unit of property. A
statement of repairs would serve its purpose much better if it con
tained the number of hours spent on a given unit of equipment or
in a certain department, or in so far as practicable, the amount of
material used in repair work by units or departments. In most
cases it will be found that it is next to impossible or that it would
consume too much time to set up such a statement, on account of
the many different kinds of material used in making repairs, the
numerous items of equipment in the plant, etc. In such cases tests
should be made, if possible.
If a table could be prepared, using the pre-war period as a
standard and showing the percentage of increase or decrease in
13

the amount of repairs, disregarding all money values, it would in
most cases show a decrease for the War Period, in spite of the fact
that actual expenditures may have been 500 per cent in excess of
the pre-war figures.
Not a small part of the increase in the repair account repre
sents repairs made on property which was not in existence in the
pre-war years. There are few steel companies that did not expand
there manufacturing facilities between 1912 and 1918. Taking
actual figures, one company whose repair account showed a 400
per cent increase in 1918 over 1912 had a book value for plant
representing a cost of twice as much in the latter as in the former
year. With more units in the plant in 1918 than in 1912, it follows
that there would be a corresponding increase in the amount of
repairs made.
The reduction in the purchasing value of the dollar is another
important factor accounting for part of the increase. The cost of
labor and practically all materials which are used in making repairs
was on an average over 150 per cent higher in 1918 than in 1912.
The following is a comparison of the cost of rebuilding open
hearth furnaces in 1914 and 1918 in one steel plant:
1914
Labor .............................. $11,215
Brick................................ 22,598

1918
$49,192
133,871

Bear in mind, however, that there was an increase in wages
for this kind of work averaging 150 per cent; the cost of brick
increased about 300 per cent; there was about 50 per cent increase
in rated furnace capacity, representing the installation of new
open hearth furnaces; there was a 30 per cent increase in the
number of shut-downs for repairs.
The increase in the cost of labor and brick may be roughly
accounted for as follows:
Labor

Cost in 1914.............................................. $11,215
150 per cent increase in cost of labor.. 16,822

30 per cent increase in number of repairs

$28,037
8,411

$36,448
50 per cent of $28,037 for increase in
furnace capacity...................... 14,019
$50,467
14

Brick

Cost in 1914............................................ $22,598
30 per cent increase in number of re
buildings ..................................
6,779
50 per cent increase in furnace capacity

$29,377
14,688

200 per cent increase in cost of brick..

$44,065
88,130
$132,195

It should be noted that the additional number of shut-downs
did not counteract depreciation on the basic structure of the fur
naces. In fact, it is possible that an increase in the number of
rebuildings might tend to weaken the basic structure. Yet, the
additional costs entailed in rebuilding are included in the repair
account and are partly responsible for the increase over the normal
amount of repairs, as far as money values are concerned.
It is practically impossible to make similar comparisons with
respect to such machinery as cranes, charging machines, etc., be
cause of the poor condition of the records of most steel companies
for 1914 and other limitations. In 1917 owing to the excess profits
tax steel companies began to realize the importance of good records,
and there has been a remarkable improvement since.
The preponderance of evidence showing the extreme neglect of
repairs, is so great that such a comparison is not necessary. There
is not an item in the repair account which did not cost at least
150 per cent more in 1918 than in any of the pre-war years, but
there are a great many items, the percentage of whose increase is
much greater than that. For example, it has already been de
scribed how repair of bed-plates, due to the use of lead instead of
cement, increased the cost from five to ten times; and how the cost
of soaking pit repairs increased 300 per cent on account of delay.
There are countless other examples which might be given. They
all lead to one conclusion, which is, that fewer or less extensive
repairs were made in the War Period than in the years prior
thereto.

Conclusion
The experiences of the various steel plants which were visited
by the writer were found to be surprisingly uniform during the
War Period and most superintendents had practically the same
comment to make in regard to production problems, dealings with
labor, troubles in making repairs, etc.
There may have been exceptional situations where abnormal
15

depreciation was not sustained during that period, but such cases
must have been rare. In the opinion of the superintendent of a
well-known steel company, the average life of an open hearth fur
nace operated under normal conditions should be about twenty
years, but on account of the abusive treatment which the furnaces
in his plant received during the War Period, their life was unques
tionably shortened by about four or five years. In the same manner
the life of other equipment throughout the plant was shortened.
To determine the extent of such extra depreciation it will be neces
sary to make a careful study of the situation in each individual case.
In closing, the writer trusts that nothing in these pages will
be interpreted as a criticism of the attitude of steel company
management during the War towards the various questions of
operation discussed herein. It no doubt was better business to
increase production at the expense of depreciation. To have at
tempted to maintain equipment at the expense of production would
have been “Penny wise and pound foolish.”
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